I. Introduction
Institutional restrictions to budgetary decision-making are a common feature of fiscal governance in the EU Member States. In particular, in the last two decades, many governments have adopted numerical fiscal rules which set explicit ceilings for key budgetary aggregates (for an overview see Debrun et al., 2008) .
These rules are mainly motivated as a device to correct coordination failures inherent in the budgetary process: governments typically consist of multiple decision-makers which cater to diverse constituencies and compete for overall fiscal resources available to society. As pointed out by von Hagen and Harden (1995) , this arrangement gives rise to a common pool problem leading to inefficiently high levels of government expenditure. Moreover, it may induce a pro-cyclical spending bias since pressures for budgetary expansion tend to intensify in upturns whereas in downturns governments may be forced to make up for past fiscal profligacy. 1 This provides a possible explanation for the positive relation between public spending and the cyclical position of the economy found in several empirical studies (for evidence on OECD countries see Lane, 2003 ; on developing countries see Kaminsky et al., 2004 ; on EU countries see Turrini, 2008) .
Against this background, a widespread consensus on the beneficial role of rules to restrict government expenditure has emerged, which is summarized by the European Commission's assessment that: 'Enforced national expenditure rules (...) 
help to counteract forces leading to pro-cyclical fiscal policy in good times
and thus prevent the need to retrench in bad times' (European Commission, 1 For models establishing a formal link between the common pool problem in budgetary processes and fiscal pro-cyclicality see Tornell and Lane (1999) and Talvi and Végh (2005) . ). Yet, while several recent studies examine the link between fiscal rules and expenditure policies in a broader context, empirical evidence for their impact on the cyclicality of government spending is scant. 2 One of the few analyses addressing this issue directly is provided by Turrini (2008) who finds that the pro-cyclical spending bias was less pronounced in those EU countries with strong expenditure rules.
The aim of the current article is to further explore the effect of expenditure rules on the cyclical stance of government expenditure in the EU Member States. In particular, we test whether governments tend to deviate from previously formulated expenditure targets in response to surprising cyclical developments and whether this reaction differs in countries with weak and strong expenditure rules. The specific focus on deviations between actual and planned government expenditure is motivated by two stylized facts (see Beetsma et al., 2009) . First, fiscal performance in the European Union has primarily suffered from a failure to implement budgetary plans rather than a lack of ambition in formulating them:
while Member States typically set out targets in their stability and convergence programmes that would lead to an improvement in budget balances, these adjustment plans tend to be overcompensated by implementation failures thus resulting in a deterioration in fiscal positions. Second, budgetary slippages mainly originate from the spending side with governments systematically 2 Focussing on the overall size of public spending, Debrun et al. (2008) find that those EU countries with strong expenditure rules tend to have slightly lower primary expenditure-to-GDP ratios. Badinger (2009) finds that after the introduction of fiscal rules in several OECD countries since the 1990s, the volatility of government spending has fallen significantly in these countries. For a sample of 15 EU countries Wierts (2008) finds that government spending tends to be less responsive to revenue windfalls or shortfalls in countries with stringent expenditure rules. By contrast, Büttner and Wildasin (2009) The article is organized as follows. Section II describes the construction of variables and presents the econometric model. Section III reports regression results. Section IV discusses policy implications and concludes.
II. Empirical Strategy

Dependent Variables
Our aim is to capture the discrepancy between governments' actual expenditure policy for a given period and their previously formulated expenditure plans. We 3 Actual revenues tend to be slightly above the levels targeted in the programmes thus exerting a positive impact on budget balances . 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 In a second step, we use disaggregated information on government expenditure to distinguish between expenditure items which are readily manipulated by policy-makers (i.e. discretionary) and those which are, in the short-run, exogenous from the government's perspective (i.e. nondiscretionary). While already conceptually this differentiation is not clear-cut, it is further inhibited by the aggregation level and reporting conventions in the stability and convergence 4 While stability and convergence programmes contain growth rate forecasts, they do not always provide the information needed to derive the GDP forecast in levels. Hence, we use the respective Commission forecast to adjust denominators and control for differences between stability and convergence programme and Commission growth rate forecasts in the empirical analysis (see Section III). In light of the related literature, the interpretation of stability and convergence programmes as a government's fiscal plans merits discussion. As pointed out by several commentators, Member States might use these programmes as a strategic device, e.g. to signal to the European authorities that they intend to meet their obligations under the Stability and Growth Pact (Strauch et al., 2004; von Hagen, 2010) . Hence, the reported fiscal paths for future periods might deviate from those which governments consider feasible based on internal projections.
However, while this concern applies to the medium-term projections in the programmes (usually covering a time horizon of up to three years) we only use the projections referring to the next year; these figures are in most cases equivalent to the budgets approved by national parliaments. Thus, in contrast to projections over a longer time horizon, they embed a direct political commitment and may thus be interpreted as the government's planned fiscal stance. 
Main Explanatory Variables
In line with related literature, we use the gap between actual and trend GDP as a measure for the cyclical position of the economy. Since we are interested in surprising developments in the cyclical position, again, we include this variable in terms of deviations between projected and actual levels. To be specific, we seek to capture the discrepancies between the actual cyclical position of the economy in year t and the cyclical position that governments expected for year t at the time when they produced their fiscal forecast in year 1 t − . Hence, a potential proxy for the governments' expectations on cyclical developments has to meet two requirements: first, it should derive from an official source which governments are likely to perceive as a benchmark for their own projections.
Second, it should be up-to-date, i.e. the time span between the release of the output gap forecast and the preparation of the stability and convergence programmes should be sufficiently short. Both conditions are likely to be met by the European Commission's autumn forecast; given that it is typically released in the third quarter of the year and provides a timely measure for the outlook on future economic conditions which prevails at the time when the stability and convergence programme projections are finalized. Accordingly, the explanatory variable for output gap surprises , i t OG is defined as the difference between the actual output gap in period t and the European Commission's output gap forecast from period 1 t − for period t . To align the denominator with that of the To capture the extent to which national expenditure policy faces domestic institutional constraints, we use the expenditure rules index as developed by Debrun et al. (2008) . This index is based on a survey conducted by the Working Group on the Quality of Public Finances among practitioners and researchers in the field of fiscal policy. It includes all budgetary provisions which fix numerical targets or ceilings for government expenditure. To attach weights to different institutions, the index takes into account both the share of overall public spending covered by the rule and qualitative features such as the type of enforcement mechanisms and media visibility. As pointed out by Inman (1998), the actual enforcement of rules is particularly important to capture the extent to which fiscal policy is really restricted by the institutional framework. Taken together, this measure bears strong appeal for empirical implementation as it translates a broad set of institutional provisions into a country-specific cardinal ranking.
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Theoretical considerations point to two different channels through which expenditure rules might mitigate pro-cyclical spending bias: first, if rules are binding in that both a marginal increase in public spending leads to noncompliance and non-compliance is associated with political or legal sanctions, they provide a direct incentive for fiscal discipline. This favourable impact on budgetary discipline in turn should be expected to prevent the need for fiscal 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 
Econometric Model
To analyze the impact of expenditure rules on budgetary discipline over the cycle, we estimate the following equation: 12 Thus, we instrument the output gap surprise variable with the forecast error in trend GDP. We extend the instrument set by the GDP-weighted average of output gaps in all foreign sample countries to capture international cyclical developments, not directly affected by domestic expenditure policy (Galí and Perotti, 2003) . While the exogeneity assumption for this variable, a priori, appears less compelling than for the forecast error in trend GDP, the number of instruments allows us to test the validity of the instrument set using over-identifying restrictions.
Another potential source of endogeneity originates from the expenditure rules index. Fiscal institutions can not generally be regarded as exogenous since both the propensity to implement certain restrictions and overall fiscal performance may be correlated with unobservable country-specific preferences (for a discussion see Poterba, 1996 and Inman, 1998) . Moreover, the self-commitment implied in effective numerical fiscal rules provides an incentive for governments with higher ability or willingness for achieving fiscal targets to implement stricter fiscal rules (see Debrun and Kumar, 2007) . However, since the 12 The European Commission computes trend GDP based on a Hodrick-Prescott filter; in general, trend values derived by this method tend to be strongly influenced by actual values at the end of the sample. However, the Commission's methodology corrects for the end point bias, thus supporting our identification strategy; see Röger and Ongena (1999) . Alesina and Perotti (1996) , they may thus be considered exogenous in the short-and medium-term.
The set of control variables includes the lagged stock of government debt and in some specifications the lagged fiscal balance to reflect the possibility that the overall fiscal position may influence the extent to which external fiscal surveillance and the financial markets force governments to comply with their expenditure targets. To allow for systematic differences in budgetary decisionmaking across countries with large and small public sectors lagged values of the expenditure or revenue ratio are included. In several specifications, we augment the model with a dummy which equals one in years of parliamentary elections and zero otherwise to take into account that upcoming elections may reinforce the incentive to 'buy political support'. Finally, in several specifications we explicitly control for inflation rates as they may affect government expenditure and nominal GDP differently thus giving rise to a 'mechanical correlation' between output gap surprises and the denominator of the dependent variables. Table 2 reports baseline regression results. The positive coefficient on the output gap surprise in column 1 points to pro-cyclical slippages in total government expenditure. To be specific, an output gap surprise of one percentage point goes along with a deviation between spending outcomes and plans of close to half a percentage point in the same direction when the expenditure rules index is at its sample mean. At the same time, the negative coefficient for the interaction term indicates that this pro-cyclical pattern is less pronounced in countries with strong expenditure rules. In particular, an increase in the expenditure rules index by one standard deviation reduces the pro-cyclical deviation in government expenditure by almost two thirds. Qualitatively similar results are obtained when analyzing primary and discretionary expenditure (see columns 2 and 3). However, the precision of estimates differs notably across specifications. While in the case of total expenditure, coefficients for the output gap surprise and the interaction term are statistically significant at a 10% significance level only, for primary expenditure the null hypotheses is rejected at a 5% level and significance rises further when studying discretionary expenditure. Given the nonresponsive nature of interest spending, we focus on primary and discretionary spending in the remainder. In the specification shown in columns 1
III. Results
14 Several robustness checks of the baseline specification were conducted. For example, we included the lagged spending item under consideration (i.e. lagged primary, discretionary or interest spending) to allow for the possibility that the ambition of fiscal plans depends on the initial size of the respective budgetary aggregate. Moreover, we explicitly controlled for factors giving rise to a "denominator effect" as described in Section II. To this end, we added inflation and the difference between the nominal GDP growth forecast from period t-1 by the European Commission and the one reported in the stability and convergence programmes as additional regressors. Our main results are unaffected by these variations in the basic model. Results for the robustness checks are available upon request. 
[TABLE 3]
Economic intuition suggests that the spending bias may occur asymmetrically over the cycle: while pressures for extra spending in good times directly derive from the political economy of the budget process, pro-cyclical tightening in bad times results from the need to make up for this spending profligacy and to ensure fiscal sustainability. However, given that none of the countries studied here faced acute sustainability concerns over the sample period, this secondary effect might be limited. Much rather, the spending bias may give rise to pro-cyclical fiscal expansions which are then not compensated for in downturns (for a discussion see Kolluri and Wahab, 2007) . To test this intuition, we modify the baseline specification by allowing the coefficients on 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 give a mixed picture. In the case of discretionary spending, the hypothesis that expenditure rules curb the risk of pro-cyclical spending overruns is confirmed.
By contrast, no statistically significant effect is found for the corresponding coefficient in the specification for primary spending. However, these results should be interpreted with caution in view of potential weak identification problems resulting from the fact that in this specification, four (rather than two) endogenous variables had to be instrumented.
As a final exercise, we return to the baseline specification and study how the overall cyclical response of spending varies over the range of the expenditure rules index. Since the coefficients on the output gap surprise variable and the interaction term have opposite signs, the pro-cyclical spending bias found at the sample mean of the expenditure rules index may in fact disappear when it takes on higher values. 16 The solid lines in Fig. 1 show how the spending response to output gap surprises changes with the expenditure rules index, controlling for all other variables included in the baseline specification (see Table 2 confidence interval and the x-axis). More intuitively, the estimates suggest that countries imitating the expenditure rules that are in place in the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, the Netherlands or Sweden (all of which score above 1.05 on the expenditure rules index) would overcome the tendency for pro-cyclical spending slippages. By contrast, for discretionary expenditure a statistically significant (albeit small) pro-cyclical bias would be expected even in the Netherlands where the expenditure rules index takes the maximum value of 2.27 (see Fig. 1 , lower panel).
[ Figure 1] 
IV. Conclusion
This paper analyzes how numerical expenditure rules shape the response of government spending to unexpected changes in macroeconomic conditions. We find that government spending reacts pro-cyclically to surprises in the output gap and that strong domestic expenditure rules serve to mitigate this tendency.
Furthermore, the analysis suggests that these findings depend on the type of government expenditure considered in the analysis: while the pro-cyclical bias is particularly pronounced for spending items with a high degree of budgetary flexibility, no cyclical patterns are detected for (largely nondiscretionary) interest expenditure. 17 The charts are constructed according to the methodology suggested by Brambor et al. (2006) . Notes: All estimates are obtained from two-stage least squares estimation including country-and time-fixed effects. Excluded instruments for the output gap surprise and its interaction with the expenditure rules index are the forecast error in trend GDP, the average output gap in all other countries in the sample and the corresponding interaction terms. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. Notes: All estimates are obtained from two-stage least squares estimation including country-and time-fixed effects. Excluded instruments for the output gap surprise and its interaction with the expenditure rules index are the forecast error in trend GDP, the average output gap in all other countries in the sample and the corresponding interaction terms. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. Critical value Stock-Yogo weak identification test for 5% maximal IV relative bias for specifications in columns (1) and (2) 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
